The following is an article I have writen for the course, Development Administration in Non Western Societies. The article has been unaltered and as such refers to this course at times but the ideas are relevant outside the course as well.
The example we have been using in class to illustrate (the wrongs of) development administration was the program of displacing people in Indonesia from the central highly populous islands to the outer lying sparsely populated islands. This in the hope that both the perceived over population on the central islands would diminish and that by some miraculous universal law that states that if you bunch enough people in a single area development will ensue. Now what I am about to say might not be the most scientific exclamation ever uttered but was there, at the time, no one who, perhaps after a night of heavy drinking wandered into his moonlit garden, vomited into his rose bushes and while he got up, into his suddenly cleared head, came the realization, THIS IS A BAD IDEA? The wrongs of this plan should be self evident.
Should we really take as our guiding project into the world of development administration such an ill conceived plan that any half sane person could tell you has to end in disaster? What does this tell us? In all honesty I’m not sure. My first response to hearing this was to say that development is a natural process. Like all natural processes it cannot be consciously created by man only influenced. This is a personal belief of mine so let me illustrate this using the example above. In 1970 the population on the Island of Java was around 75 million[1]. This was considered to be overpopulated at the time but the idea of resolving this perceived over population by moving part of the populous borders on the insane and in a very real sense the criminal. Shipping 250.000 people away from the island, although logistically an immense operation would have no consequence on the overall population on the island, indeed to decrease the population by a modest 15% you would have to move 11¼ million people away from the island and that is not even considering natural growth and migration both of which were and are very high. Indeed, the historical growth of the islands population was not halted by the program and today the population of Java exceeds 120million. Of course I need not convince anyone of the foolishness of the program but I’m not sure everyone understands why the idea was so bad. From the reactions in class many were aimed at the implementation. The sites chosen to house the people were bad or the help they received wasn’t adequate. This forgoes the larger issue, that the very idea behind the plan was false.
Each nation has its own economic centre (or centres). Even in a very atypical area such as the Rhine delta in North Western Europe we can see a clear distinction between centre and periphery. The densely populated Randstad region against the sparsely populated Northern Provinces, the highly industrious Ruhr and its immediate hinterland. In the 1970s in the Netherlands a very broad and well backed government program was set up to lure employment away from the Randstad and into the more backward and depressed North of the country. At first by government grants to stimulate businesses to the area. When that failed extra taxes for businesses in the West of the country were levied. The only result of the program was that foreign businesses considering the Netherlands as an investment location chose either Belgium, Great Britain or Germany instead. You cannot force development.
Now as to the myth of over population. It doesn’t exist. It never has and never will. Even though the population nearly doubled on the island of Java as we have seen there is still no shortage of food. There is poverty and as a result of that hunger but this is not because food is immediately scarce. Around the globe there are now more people living in cities than there are living in the country. Cities barely grow their own food and never in high enough quantities to sustain themselves. This is not a problem as the food is transported from elsewhere to feed the population in the cities. Such a relative scarcity will drive up food prices and higher prices will stimulate production, require more workers and create the need for and possibility of innovation by local and regional food producers. A higher population without the possibility of increasing arable land in parallel with population growth means that there are more unemployed people. In such an environment subsistence economy (a simple type of economy where each family grows or produces all they need themselves or acquire it through simple bartering from other subsistence based families) is no longer possible. It may still be viewed as an ideal by the Indonesian or Javan people but the ideal is an illusion. You can look at the wish for development as requiring change on a societal level as the (western) model of development requires certain facets to be present in society. This isn’t untrue but there is a far more basic truth that creates a need for change. Present third world societies are often not capable of sustaining their existence. We not only see this in Indonesia but also in Africa. Hunting bush meat (basically any edible animal living in the jungle) has been a staple of the (central) African diet for as long as man has lived in the area. Today however population increases have caused the people living on this meat to grow beyond the jungles capacity to provide it. That in turn has caused many species to be threatened with extinction. You can see this as an Eco problem that we must preserve the precious nature of the area or you can conclude that if all the animals are hunted to extinction the people will start dying anyway. In either case the need for societal change should be self evident from the immediate problem at hand not from some western ideal.
This conclusion is no different in developed countries than it is in underdeveloped countries. For example there has been an ongoing debate for decades in the Netherlands on the need for change in the social security field. The decreasing ratio of workers to non-workers (either unemployed, students or elderly) is rightly seen as a threat to the current system. Once this ratio becomes lopsided enough for workers to be unable to sustain the non-workers socialism might still be the ideal for some but change is no longer a political choice but an inevitability.
This realization has an impact on the role of public administration in a country. We have seen theories that state that governments and, as an extension of them, public administration serves the people in power and their needs rather than the people as a whole (the democratic ideal). It is my belief that there is no such thing as a people. A government is often confronted with situations where they can only serve one side. A winner take all situation where the winnings are directly and inversely related to the other side’s loss. In Venezuela we have recently seen this dichotomy in action. President Chavez was elected by in adequately fair elections. His rule threatened the position of the countries traditional elite and they stages a coup that ousted Chavez and helped a more friendly President(general) in power. The coup ultimately failed but the point is that the government (and military) were serving the interests of those in the elite and directly opposing the interests of the all others. That the reinstated Chavez government has nothing whatsoever to do with the democratic ideal can be plainly seen by looking at the subsequent developments in Venezuela. This series of events is mirrored in virtually every other developing country around the globe.
Democracy is way to legitimise governments and their policies it is not a way to overcome problems. Democratic governments don’t serve the entire population but only those people whose support they require or those who seemingly fall within the boundaries of their political ideals. In that sense they are no different from a non-democratic government. I’m not saying that democratically elected governments are not preferable to non-democratic ones, I’m saying that democratic system do not have an inherently higher problem solving capability to non democratic systems. I’m also not saying that Public Administration should not serve the peoples interests, I’m saying there is no such thing as the peoples interests. To summarise let me say that I’m all for making countries democratic as long as you don’t expect to solve any development question simply by making a country democratic.
The bread and butter of public administration is goal attainment. Without getting into the hairy and unresolved issues surrounding the freedom of the public administrator we can conclude that public administration more or less follow the wishes of its government. Most third world governments mostly serve the needs of a single group in society and democracy on its own doesn’t change that. One of the questions we have been asked to answer is what the role of public administration should be in development. In Indonesia at the time of this program the role of Public Administration was to serve the needs of the Soeharto family. To keep them in power and to enrich its members, a task it was very capable of performing. In that role it would choose as the recipient of a new logging contract not the company that offered to rebuild the infrastructure of the area around the logging site or who offered to employ the most locals even in the more demanding managerial positions but the company that offered the biggest villa or most expensive Aston Martin. The theory of democratic government would state that a democratic government would make a different choice and so it does. But exactly how would it be different?
For this mental exercise we must forget the evidence that many democratically elected governments turn out to be as corrupt as the non democratic governments that they have succeeded (as per the above Venezuelan example) and state that democratic governments serve their voters immediate perceived interests. This is where we run into difficulties. As Dr. Wuisman has stated in class the majority of Indonesians see it as an ideal to own their own plot of land and grow their own food. In essence live in a subsistence based economy. As we have seen previously in this article that ideal is simply unattainable. From a development perspective it would be required that the government educates people to stop seeing subsistence as an ideal. The likely outcome would be that the populace becomes angered at the current government and votes them out of office the first chance they get. Any government would realize that and no matter the gravity of the problem any government in country developed or not is more than capable of ignoring such problems if the dealing with them means losing their power. Again, what we see is that democracy does not, by itself, have an answer to development issues. This does not negate all the other benefits a democratic government brings nor is it true that non-democratic governments do have an innate ability to deal with development issues. What I am simply trying to get across is that democracy cannot be an answer to development issues.
So what is needed and to get back to the question what is the role of development administration if it is not to serve its voters in their direct wishes? As said before Public Administration is about goal attainment. In my opinion the role of public administration is its responsibility for dealing with obstructions to attaining its goal. In development it would the obstructions to development, which is wholly different from creating some grand scheme to satisfy an ideal. For this sometimes political realities like voters dissatisfaction need to be faced and overcome. If so than it is a governments duty to do so. Easier said than done but then development hasn’t really occurred in many places in the third world so that at least corroborates this view on development.
[1] Indonesia: Environment and Development, World Bank Country Study, 1994, page 11
maandag 19 november 2007
donderdag 13 september 2007
Why we should not let Kosovo become independent.
It is, of course, the romantic thing to do. The valiant and ancient people of Kosovo, who have endured so much hardship over such a long time at the hands of such an evil, oppressive regime should receive their own nation, sovereign among the people of the world. But romantic notions have seldom had anything to do with reality and steadfastly refuse to be bothered by anything as mundane as real world consequences. So leaving romanticism as a failed nineteenth century experiment behind us let’s look at what is best. For us, them and anyone caught in between.
When Kosovo has been in the news lately it has been because of developments in the talks between the Serbs, ethnic Albanian Kosovars and the UN but this doesn’t, by any means mean that the province has been peaceful since the last outbreak of publicized violence. Protests, clashes with security forces and even murder is commonplace and frustrating cooperation between the two communities now living apart in Kosovo is daily reality. It is fair to say that there is next to no communication between the Serbian and ethnic Albanian population of Kosovo. Doing so comes with great risk of reprisals from Nationalists on both sides and is therefore no more than incidental. A good example of this is the Mitrovica a town in the North of Kosovo. It is the largest urban center for the Serbs living in the North of Kosovo. Mitrovica is where the ethnic line between Serbs and Kosovar Albanians is most evident. It is the place in Kosovo where a large Serbian population and ethnic Albanian population live in close proximity to each other. The river Ibar, that cuts the city in two, also acts as dividing line between the two communities. Residential buildings on both sides of the river are sometimes just 50 meters apart, with only the water and KFOR soldiers as physical barriers.
The river is not only a border between communities, its also a border when it comes to administration of the region and basics requirements such as water and electricity.
The power plant that provides power to the entire town is located on the Kosovar side. This power plant serves Pristina, and North Kosovo. Under its role as civil administrator the UN mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) sees to it that all communities are provided with essentials. This requires constant pressure on Albanian Kosovar politicians and utility companies to ensures that the Serbian side is also provided with electricity. The problem is that Kosovo is a net importer of electricity on the one hand, with its own power stations close to the provincial capital Pristina struggling to cope, and on the other hand shady money making schemes mean that sometimes local electricity is pumped to Albania, instead of North Kosovo. Merchants that sell diesel and gasoline powered generators make a decent living all over Kosovo.
Even with an unreliable electricity supply, the problem widens in that the Serbs do not pay for the electricity used. Is this stubborn nationalism? In part perhaps but more importantly the office where the Serbians need to register to even be able to pay is also located on the Albanian Kosovar side of Mitrovica, and going there means risking their own lives, from Nationalist on both sides. The UN has refused to open an office on the Serbian side of town because this would clash with their policy that Serbians and Kosovars need to use the same facilities in order to not grown apart any further. A policy that clearly isn’t working. The Serbian community in Kosovo is serviced almost entirely by a clandestine (meaning not UN approved) Belgrade led civil service. As shown this is not just Nationalistic stubbornness but plain necessity as well. Kosovo has become a rich export ground for second rate Albanian (the country) made products. Not because Serbia refuses export of its own goods to Albanian controlled areas but because there is a notion among nationalistic Kosovars that they need to be self sufficient and not dependant for anything on the regional industrial monopolist, Serbia. Medical supplies, building materials and food items such as beer and Coca Cola are imported from Serbia on a large scale. But there is a substantial Albanian Kosovar nationalistic bloc that deems this to be against Kosovar interests such as independence and an economy based on local production. Small shopkeepers and government officials alike get pressured verbally or sometimes even worse by this bloc to go for “Patriotic products”. Groups like vetevendosje (self-determination) pressure locals and provide propaganda against Serbians and Serbian products. We can conclude from this that normal contact between both communities in Kosovo are rare. The talks on the final status of Kosovo with the UN are the only recurrent way for the two sides to meet each other but here little more than recriminations are lobbed from one side to the other.
All this still doesn’t explain, however, why Kosovo should not become independent. For starters it would not solve a single problem in that province today. The UN policy of forcing both communities to work together and their dream of a future multi ethnic state is not working today and there is no reason to suspect it will work in an independent Kosovo. It is much more likely that such an attempt would have no effect on altering the current situation. Nationalistic Kosovars, the very people who are running Albanian Kosovo want all Serbs out, they do not want, and have shown no signs to ever accepts Serbs living in Kosovo. How will that change by giving them an independent state with administrative control over those Serbs and access to an armed forces which they assume they are free to use? At the very least it would require continued armed presence from European and US forces who would increasingly come into conflict with Kosovar armed forces and the inevitable Serbian counter punch. A recipe for crisis if not disaster.
But this doesn’t stop at the border of Kosovo. The Nationalistic Albanian Kosovars, again those who are in control, have a dream of a Grand Albanian state on the Balkans that encompasses not only Albania itself and Kosovo but also parts of Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro and as far North as Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is an outspoken wish by ethnic Albanians to join with Albania and form a single state. Independence, in its limited form proposed by Ahtisaari, for Kosovo is only a first step for them to achieve their larger goal and they are making no secret of this. Ahtisaari has proposed a limited sovereignty for Kosovo with strict assurances for ethnic minorities. Apart from Serbs there was also a substantial Roma community in Kosovo as well as several smaller minorities including Turks and Bosniaks (Muslim from Bosnia-Herzegovina). These assurances would include the right to return for those who fled during the 1999 Kosovo war. The Serb population declined in that conflict from 19% to just under 10%. The preceding examples should be enough to show how little interest either side has of setting up a multi ethnic state. Living together just isn’t going to happen. Failure of the Ahtisaari plan is virtually guaranteed opening the door for Albanians to seize more power and declare unilateral independence. The recent US move of promising to recognize such a move only shows how little the US truly understands of the precarious situation in the Balkans.
That the dream of independence and a grand Albanian state will not stop at the borders of Kosovo should be clear to anyone as this has already caused a near war in Macedonia in the first half of 2001. Ethnic Albanian incursions into southern Serbia are also on record. Granting Kosovar independence is therefore opening a door to further destabilization of the Balkan.
It needs to be noted how several organizations and governments have played a disreputable role in the developments inside Kosovo and the larger region. Kosovo was and still is the poorest province of Serbia. This wasn’t caused by the current conflict or previous conflicts. The economic basis for prosperity simply isn’t there. It is a backward province of a backward region. Kosovo has seen the influx of large sums both in the form of direct funds for rebuilding and the tens of thousands of foreigners who have come to Kosovo as part of NATO’s stabilization force, the UN administration or one of numerous charities and who spend their money in restaurants and shops. The belief has taken hold among ordinary ethnic Albanians that this false prosperity will continue and that the European union will continue to spend billions annually to prop up the failing economy. This isn’t helped by the previous promise made by the US that an independent Kosovo will become part of the EU. Ignoring the continued US policy of promising countries and peoples access to an organization they are no part of and have no say over we can conclude that an independent Kosovo has no place in the EU. All EU member states first need to prove that they are deserving of EU membership before entering. In absolutely no way does Kosovo qualify for this. This test is not in place because of self-serving disinterest but because, although the EU has strong capabilities for political and economic pressure it lacks any kind method of force of arms to back up its claims if political and economic pressure fail. Ethnic Albanians and Serbians alike have a history of ignoring any kind of pressure short of the force of arms.
The UN itself has also proven it is unable to make headway in the conflict. This is mostly due to its own ignorance of the true situation on the grounds. Its own headstrong persistence of clinging to its own fantasy of a multi ethnic state in Kosovo despite overbearing evidence to the contrary has only helped to alienate the Serbian community in Kosovo and the Belgrade officials. It has also given the Albanians the belief that if they persist long enough they can achieve their dream of a Greater Albanian state with the help of the UN and the EU. The Serbs are by no means victims in this conflict but neither are the Albanians. The continued US policy of treating one side as perpetrators that need to be punished is, at best, not constructive at worst counterproductive. On its current course the situation in Kosovo is heading for another open war that threatens to spill over into neighboring territories.
The true situation in Kosovo today leaves little room to maneuver for all parties. Nationalistic pride on both sides is easily hurt but giving in to these feelings will only help alienate the other side and make the achievement of a solution even more difficult. Today the only course of action that gives the possibility of a lasting peace is one where the Albanian struggle is contained within the borders of Kosovo. To achieve this independence needs to be avoided. The best solution within reach is to divide Kosovo in a Serbian part, administered from Belgrade and an autonomous ethnic Albanian part administered by the EU while Kosovo as a province remains part of Serbia. It is worth noting that the security resolution 1244 (that established the UN mission in Kosovo) calls for the eventual return of Serbian security forces with limited tasks like border patrols and protection of the Serbian community. This would still require a continued presence of the NATO stabilization force but that is true whatever the outcome. Although far from ideal it is simply an acknowledgement of an already existing situation and one that allows for a gradual waning of the present tensions. This is also the exact extend of a Serbian proposal for a solution, one that was rejected by the UN out of hand because of their continued belief in the fairy tale of an multi ethnic state.
Authored by Th X Kurpershoek and Th Huisman
When Kosovo has been in the news lately it has been because of developments in the talks between the Serbs, ethnic Albanian Kosovars and the UN but this doesn’t, by any means mean that the province has been peaceful since the last outbreak of publicized violence. Protests, clashes with security forces and even murder is commonplace and frustrating cooperation between the two communities now living apart in Kosovo is daily reality. It is fair to say that there is next to no communication between the Serbian and ethnic Albanian population of Kosovo. Doing so comes with great risk of reprisals from Nationalists on both sides and is therefore no more than incidental. A good example of this is the Mitrovica a town in the North of Kosovo. It is the largest urban center for the Serbs living in the North of Kosovo. Mitrovica is where the ethnic line between Serbs and Kosovar Albanians is most evident. It is the place in Kosovo where a large Serbian population and ethnic Albanian population live in close proximity to each other. The river Ibar, that cuts the city in two, also acts as dividing line between the two communities. Residential buildings on both sides of the river are sometimes just 50 meters apart, with only the water and KFOR soldiers as physical barriers.
The river is not only a border between communities, its also a border when it comes to administration of the region and basics requirements such as water and electricity.
The power plant that provides power to the entire town is located on the Kosovar side. This power plant serves Pristina, and North Kosovo. Under its role as civil administrator the UN mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) sees to it that all communities are provided with essentials. This requires constant pressure on Albanian Kosovar politicians and utility companies to ensures that the Serbian side is also provided with electricity. The problem is that Kosovo is a net importer of electricity on the one hand, with its own power stations close to the provincial capital Pristina struggling to cope, and on the other hand shady money making schemes mean that sometimes local electricity is pumped to Albania, instead of North Kosovo. Merchants that sell diesel and gasoline powered generators make a decent living all over Kosovo.
Even with an unreliable electricity supply, the problem widens in that the Serbs do not pay for the electricity used. Is this stubborn nationalism? In part perhaps but more importantly the office where the Serbians need to register to even be able to pay is also located on the Albanian Kosovar side of Mitrovica, and going there means risking their own lives, from Nationalist on both sides. The UN has refused to open an office on the Serbian side of town because this would clash with their policy that Serbians and Kosovars need to use the same facilities in order to not grown apart any further. A policy that clearly isn’t working. The Serbian community in Kosovo is serviced almost entirely by a clandestine (meaning not UN approved) Belgrade led civil service. As shown this is not just Nationalistic stubbornness but plain necessity as well. Kosovo has become a rich export ground for second rate Albanian (the country) made products. Not because Serbia refuses export of its own goods to Albanian controlled areas but because there is a notion among nationalistic Kosovars that they need to be self sufficient and not dependant for anything on the regional industrial monopolist, Serbia. Medical supplies, building materials and food items such as beer and Coca Cola are imported from Serbia on a large scale. But there is a substantial Albanian Kosovar nationalistic bloc that deems this to be against Kosovar interests such as independence and an economy based on local production. Small shopkeepers and government officials alike get pressured verbally or sometimes even worse by this bloc to go for “Patriotic products”. Groups like vetevendosje (self-determination) pressure locals and provide propaganda against Serbians and Serbian products. We can conclude from this that normal contact between both communities in Kosovo are rare. The talks on the final status of Kosovo with the UN are the only recurrent way for the two sides to meet each other but here little more than recriminations are lobbed from one side to the other.
All this still doesn’t explain, however, why Kosovo should not become independent. For starters it would not solve a single problem in that province today. The UN policy of forcing both communities to work together and their dream of a future multi ethnic state is not working today and there is no reason to suspect it will work in an independent Kosovo. It is much more likely that such an attempt would have no effect on altering the current situation. Nationalistic Kosovars, the very people who are running Albanian Kosovo want all Serbs out, they do not want, and have shown no signs to ever accepts Serbs living in Kosovo. How will that change by giving them an independent state with administrative control over those Serbs and access to an armed forces which they assume they are free to use? At the very least it would require continued armed presence from European and US forces who would increasingly come into conflict with Kosovar armed forces and the inevitable Serbian counter punch. A recipe for crisis if not disaster.
But this doesn’t stop at the border of Kosovo. The Nationalistic Albanian Kosovars, again those who are in control, have a dream of a Grand Albanian state on the Balkans that encompasses not only Albania itself and Kosovo but also parts of Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro and as far North as Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is an outspoken wish by ethnic Albanians to join with Albania and form a single state. Independence, in its limited form proposed by Ahtisaari, for Kosovo is only a first step for them to achieve their larger goal and they are making no secret of this. Ahtisaari has proposed a limited sovereignty for Kosovo with strict assurances for ethnic minorities. Apart from Serbs there was also a substantial Roma community in Kosovo as well as several smaller minorities including Turks and Bosniaks (Muslim from Bosnia-Herzegovina). These assurances would include the right to return for those who fled during the 1999 Kosovo war. The Serb population declined in that conflict from 19% to just under 10%. The preceding examples should be enough to show how little interest either side has of setting up a multi ethnic state. Living together just isn’t going to happen. Failure of the Ahtisaari plan is virtually guaranteed opening the door for Albanians to seize more power and declare unilateral independence. The recent US move of promising to recognize such a move only shows how little the US truly understands of the precarious situation in the Balkans.
That the dream of independence and a grand Albanian state will not stop at the borders of Kosovo should be clear to anyone as this has already caused a near war in Macedonia in the first half of 2001. Ethnic Albanian incursions into southern Serbia are also on record. Granting Kosovar independence is therefore opening a door to further destabilization of the Balkan.
It needs to be noted how several organizations and governments have played a disreputable role in the developments inside Kosovo and the larger region. Kosovo was and still is the poorest province of Serbia. This wasn’t caused by the current conflict or previous conflicts. The economic basis for prosperity simply isn’t there. It is a backward province of a backward region. Kosovo has seen the influx of large sums both in the form of direct funds for rebuilding and the tens of thousands of foreigners who have come to Kosovo as part of NATO’s stabilization force, the UN administration or one of numerous charities and who spend their money in restaurants and shops. The belief has taken hold among ordinary ethnic Albanians that this false prosperity will continue and that the European union will continue to spend billions annually to prop up the failing economy. This isn’t helped by the previous promise made by the US that an independent Kosovo will become part of the EU. Ignoring the continued US policy of promising countries and peoples access to an organization they are no part of and have no say over we can conclude that an independent Kosovo has no place in the EU. All EU member states first need to prove that they are deserving of EU membership before entering. In absolutely no way does Kosovo qualify for this. This test is not in place because of self-serving disinterest but because, although the EU has strong capabilities for political and economic pressure it lacks any kind method of force of arms to back up its claims if political and economic pressure fail. Ethnic Albanians and Serbians alike have a history of ignoring any kind of pressure short of the force of arms.
The UN itself has also proven it is unable to make headway in the conflict. This is mostly due to its own ignorance of the true situation on the grounds. Its own headstrong persistence of clinging to its own fantasy of a multi ethnic state in Kosovo despite overbearing evidence to the contrary has only helped to alienate the Serbian community in Kosovo and the Belgrade officials. It has also given the Albanians the belief that if they persist long enough they can achieve their dream of a Greater Albanian state with the help of the UN and the EU. The Serbs are by no means victims in this conflict but neither are the Albanians. The continued US policy of treating one side as perpetrators that need to be punished is, at best, not constructive at worst counterproductive. On its current course the situation in Kosovo is heading for another open war that threatens to spill over into neighboring territories.
The true situation in Kosovo today leaves little room to maneuver for all parties. Nationalistic pride on both sides is easily hurt but giving in to these feelings will only help alienate the other side and make the achievement of a solution even more difficult. Today the only course of action that gives the possibility of a lasting peace is one where the Albanian struggle is contained within the borders of Kosovo. To achieve this independence needs to be avoided. The best solution within reach is to divide Kosovo in a Serbian part, administered from Belgrade and an autonomous ethnic Albanian part administered by the EU while Kosovo as a province remains part of Serbia. It is worth noting that the security resolution 1244 (that established the UN mission in Kosovo) calls for the eventual return of Serbian security forces with limited tasks like border patrols and protection of the Serbian community. This would still require a continued presence of the NATO stabilization force but that is true whatever the outcome. Although far from ideal it is simply an acknowledgement of an already existing situation and one that allows for a gradual waning of the present tensions. This is also the exact extend of a Serbian proposal for a solution, one that was rejected by the UN out of hand because of their continued belief in the fairy tale of an multi ethnic state.
Authored by Th X Kurpershoek and Th Huisman
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